

German Consul Fritz Schellhorn's Interventions on Behalf of Jews in Czernowitz¹

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Fritz Schellhorn was German consul in Czernowitz, Romania, from 1934 to 1944, except for the period between December 1940 and November 1941, when he served in Jassy, due to the Soviet occupation of Northern Bukovina in the summer of 1940. The highest percentage of Jews of German culture in all major cities in Eastern Europe could be found in Czernowitz; at times 50 percent of the inhabitants were Jewish.

Despite his being an emissary of the Nazi regime, and regardless of how he is depicted in certain accounts after the war, in fact Schellhorn supported Jews in many cases, especially during the murderous persecution in Bukovina and Bessarabia from June 1941 through June 1942. His two most successful operations took place in 1941. He opposed the rampaging of *Sonderkommando* 10b of Einsatzgruppe D in July 1941, and the deportations from the Czernowitz ghetto in October/November 1941. In the course of these events he proved to be a man of outstanding courage, driven by a desire to help people in need, with no consideration of personal danger or personal gain.

Schellhorn was captured by Romanian forces in September 1944, together with other German diplomatic staff, and was imprisoned in the Soviet Union until 1955. After his release he wrote several extensive reports, totaling more than 400 pages, about his time in Romania. His detailed *Nachlass* ("legacy"), as well as his official texts from the period in Bukovina are key to understanding his rescue activity.² They include "Notes about the Events during My Work as Head of the German Consulate at Czernowitz, at Jassy, again at Czernowitz and in the Consuls

- 1 In the interest of full disclosure, the author wishes to note that Gertrud Bindewald, Fritz Schellhorn's secretary from 1938 to 1944, whose affidavit is discussed below, married the author's widowed father in 1955. Her sister Ottilie married Schellhorn in 1942.
- 2 *Nachlass* Schellhorn, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA).

Department of the German Legation in Bucharest”;³ and the draft of his essay “From Bratianu the Elder to Codreanu and Antonescu: A Contribution to the History of the Persecution of Jews in Romania.”⁴ The latter contains a detailed report about the consulate in Czernowitz and Schellhorn’s actions on behalf of Jews. Schellhorn’s *Nachlass* also includes affidavits concerning his work in Romania, as well as private letters that cannot be published with full names. This article is based on earlier research but expands upon it.⁵

Schellhorn was born in 1888, the oldest of ten children, and grew up in Rottweil in Swabia, in a home characterized by Christian ethics. His father owned and managed a lawyer’s office. At that time middle-class life included serving voluntarily in the military for one year, followed by an academic career. Schellhorn studied medicine at the universities of Tübingen, Berlin, Munich, and, for two terms, at the University of Lausanne, becoming an expert in pathology. In 1912, he became an assistant to his Ph.D. supervisor Paul von Baumgarten in Tübingen. Everything seemed set for his career as a scholar and professor, but with the outbreak of war, in 1914, he was drafted and served as a reserve medical assistant from August 1, 1914 to November 3, 1918. He eventually rose to the rank of captain in the medical reserve.

He was involved in the deadliest battles and proved to be brave, level-headed, and committed to saving lives.⁶ However, finding that

- 3 “Aufzeichnung über die Ereignisse während meiner Tätigkeit als Leiter des Deutschen Konsulats in Czernowitz, in Jassy, wieder in Czernowitz und der Konsularabteilung der Deutschen Gesandtschaft in Bucharest,” typescript, 1961, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 4 and 5 (“Aufzeichnung”).
- 4 “Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Judenverfolgungen in Rumänien,” typescript, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 1.
- 5 Hartwig Cremers, “Generalkonsul Dr. Dr. Fritz Gebhard Schellhorn,” *Halbjahresschrift für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik*, 23:1–2 (2011), pp. 129–141, at <http://czernowitz.blogspot.de/search?updated-max=2009-11-14T12:37:00%2B01:00&max-results=100&start=4&by-date=false>; idem, “Generalkonsul Dr. Dr. Fritz Gebhard Schellhorn. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Juden in Czernowitz 1940–1943” (in English: idem, Consul General Dr. Dr. Fritz Gebhard Schellhorn — A Contribution to the History of the Jews in Czernowitz 1940–1943), at <http://czernowitz.blogspot.de/search?updated-max=2009-11-14T12:37:00%2B01:00&max-results=100&start=4&by-date=false>; idem, “Czernowitz 1941/42 — Der Einsatz des deutschen Konsuls Fritz Schellhorn für die Juden,” *Südost-Forschungen*, vol. 73 (2014), pp. 444–473.
- 6 Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv, ed., *Bayerns Goldenes Ehrenbuch gewidmet den Inhabern der höchsten bayerischen Kriegsauszeichnungen aus dem Weltkrieg 1914/1918*

he could “no longer stand the sight of blood,” as he once told me, he sought a new career. He completed a Ph.D. in political science at the University of Tübingen under Carl Friedrich Sartorius⁷ and joined the foreign service on November 2, 1920. He was given assignments in Brussels, which had only recently been an enemy country and where he had served in the military; Reykjavik; Vienna; and Paris. During his time in Vienna, he mainly served as deputy German member on the Danube Commission, which was composed of the Danube riparian states in order to deal with the common problems of the Danube shipping route. From March 1931 until July 1933, he served in the embassy in Paris, one of the most important diplomatic representations, as a legation counselor. He became fluent in French.

Schellhorn was in Paris when the Nazis took power in Germany, and he decided to join the local Paris branch of the NSDAP.⁸ He later said that he was mainly attracted by the idea of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (“people’s community”), as opposed to traditional society with its social-status divisions (mostly based on lineage) or the socialist idea of different classes (defined economically). In the party in Paris he found enthusiastic young people, and he later claimed that there were no hints of antisemitism in this group.⁹ After his recall to Berlin in July 1933, he became part of a SS Cavalry Corps (“Reitersturm”) for several months, as he loved equestrian sports, but he never got beyond the status of an “aspirant” in this field. Although the International Military Tribunal explicitly did not include the “so-called Reiter-SS” when it condemned the SS as a criminal organization,¹⁰ we now know that units of mounted SS were involved in murder actions during the war.

(Munich: Joseph Hyronimus, 1928), p. 56, which also mentions other of Schellhorn’s assignments. He was awarded the Bavarian order of military medicine, first class, which was awarded only eleven times. See also Schellhorn’s own comments on his war experiences in his notes, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 1.

7 Sartorius became a member of the DDP (German Democratic Party) during this time.

8 Party No. 3 280 915, doc center apo 742-US ARMY Berlin.

9 “Aufzeichnung,” p. 17. Many historians would doubt this claim, but some classic “functionalist” historians have argued that ideology and antisemitism did not play a central role in early Nazi policy-making or in the party’s attraction for many Germans. See, for example, Hans Mommsen, *Das NS-Regime und die Auslöschung des Judentums in Europa* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), pp. 36–39.

10 *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vom 14. November 1945–1. Oktober 1946*, vol. I, International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, p. 307 (quoted in Nele Fahrenbrück, “Reitsport im Nationalsozialismus,” in Arnd Krüger and Bernd

After returning to Berlin in July 1933, he worked in the foreign ministry's culture department, where he developed doubts regarding the new government.¹¹ He thus searched for a position with consular (i.e., not political) responsibilities abroad. He particularly loved economic consultations and caring for people from his own country. He got himself posted to Czernowitz.¹²

Czernowitz

From this point Schellhorn's fate was to be linked to Bukovina forever. He loved the country's natural surroundings, and particularly the Carpathians. Although he did not learn to speak Romanian fluently, he became enamored with the diversity of the country's inhabitants — Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Romanians, Jews, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Hutsuls, etc. — and the Old-Austrian atmosphere, and made friends with people from diverse ethnic groups.

In order to integrate into the society, he joined a "Dragos Voda" hunting club, where he met many members of different national groups, including Jews, as well as a forest superintendent who was to become his father-in-law in 1942.

As his responsibilities were confined to the district and consular tasks, and not the political relations between Romania and Germany, Ottmar Trașcă does not mention him in his book on Romanian-German political and military relations during the war.¹³

Schellhorn asserted in his "*Aufzeichnung*"¹⁴ that the contempt for human rights and the disrespect for law and justice evident on the "Night of the Long Knives" (June 30–July 1, 1934)¹⁵ and the murder of persons he respected, including his conservative friends Edgar Jung and

Wedemeyer-Kolwe, eds., *Vergessen, Verdrängt, Abgelehnt — zur Geschichte der Ausgrenzung im Sport* [Berlin: Schriftenreihe des Niedersächsischen Instituts für Sportgeschichte Hoya, 2009], vol. 2, p. 36, n. 22). Schellhorn was able to leverage this membership in his dealings with the SS-Sonderkommando in July 1941.

11 "Aufzeichnung," p. 18.

12 Schellhorn started running the consulate on May 16, 1934.

13 Ottmar Trașcă, *Relațiile politice și militare româno-germane: septembrie 1940–august 1944* (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut: 2013).

14 Schellhorn, "Aufzeichnung," p. 18.

15 Schellhorn had been in Czernowitz since May 1934; i.e., also on the "Night of the Long Knives."

Herbert von Bose, “destroyed all faith that the situation and the state of the party might improve.”¹⁶

Nevertheless, whereas Schellhorn remained in the NSDAP, his actions did not show National-Socialist convictions, and he did not shy away from confrontations with Nazi institutions.¹⁷ For example, in the fights of the Nazi group in Bukovina against the Catholic youth groups led by Father Georg Goebel, he defended Goebel. Goebel returned to Germany in 1940, with the last Germans and was soon imprisoned by the Gestapo. Goebel later wrote:

...I was not the only target of this battle, but also the consul, who always stood up for me and my work.... leading proponents of the Renewal Movement tried to get higher party institutions to put the German consul into a concentration camp if he refused to comply with their demands... Despite these enmities Mr. Schellhorn managed to keep me in my position until the resettlements of the Germans...¹⁸

In late 1935, there were confidential reports about Schellhorn from the Nazi group in Bukovina, “that it would be possible within 5–6 weeks to throw the reactionary Institute of Foreign Affairs, the German consul at Czernowitz, and Father Goebel into concentration camps...as those people strive to overthrow today’s Hitler-Germany.”¹⁹

Jews were generally not subjects of Schellhorn’s reports to the legation at that time. One exception was his report addressing Decree 3180 I A II of November 12, 1937.²⁰ In contrast to the often antisemitic reports by other diplomats, Schellhorn’s report was “dry, objective and

16 “Aufzeichnung,” p. 18. Jung wrote Franz von Papen’s June 17, 1934, Marburg Speech in which he criticized the Nazi party. Hermann Göring had the speech’s author murdered. See Erik Larson, *In the Garden of Beasts: Love, Terror and an American Family in Hitler’s Berlin* (New York: Crown, 2011), pp. 312–313.

17 For a summary of his work, see “Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu,” p. 118.

18 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

19 Original document in Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 7. Father Goebel had leaked the documents to Schellhorn. See also a report of a Nazi meeting in Gura Humorului, on November 26–28, 1935, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 6.

20 Haim Shamir, “Die jüdische Gemeinde von Czernowitz 1937 in deutscher Sicht,” in *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, 4 (1975), pp. 484–497. The original decree, a circular that solicited reports about the Jews in the respective district, could not be found, according to a Bundesarchiv letter to the author, October 7, 2013.

technical,” according to Haim Shamir, and most of the facts were described correctly. The same can be said about Schellhorn’s reports regarding a speech by Jabotinsky in Czernowitz on October 31, 1938, or on developments in Palestine (January 3, 1939).²¹

Schellhorn’s encounter with General Ion Antonescu, who was sidelined at that time but whom he got to know in March 1939,²² was important for his later achievement — aborting at least one of Antonescu’s decisions regarding the murder of Jews.

The Soviet Occupation of Bukovina in 1940

Schellhorn’s efforts to save Romanians in Northern Bukovina, in 1940, proved to be a decisive factor for his later success. Romania ceded this region, including Czernowitz, to the Soviet Union on June 28, 1940, as part of the implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.²³ Germans were allowed to leave the occupied territory but Romanians were not.²⁴

Schellhorn details his attempts to assist not only Germans in their resettlement, but also Romanians. He had gotten himself subordinated to the embassy in Moscow. During a visit there he asked SS-*Obergruppenführer* Werner Lorenz, head of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (VoMi), which brought ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe “back to the Reich,” for magnanimity in ascertaining the “Germanhood” of those wanting to leave Bukovina.²⁵ Schellhorn’s efforts helped many Romanians get out,²⁶ which led Antonescu to thank him profusely. In February 1941, Antonescu also expressed his thanks by making him a

21 PAAA, XE 13, Judenfragen 1932–1939.

22 “Aufzeichnung,” p. 29. On further encounters with Antonescu, see *ibid.*, pp. 43, 45, 48, 73.

23 See Andrej Angrick, “Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte. Impressionen zur deutschen Einflussnahme bei der Volkstumspolitik in Czernowitz vor ‘Barbarossa’ und nach Beginn des Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion,” in Alfred Gottwaldt, Norbert Kampe, and Peter Klein, eds., *NS-Gewaltherrschaft Beiträge zur historischen Forschung und juristischen Aufarbeitung* (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 2005) pp. 331f.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 332–334.

25 “Aufzeichnung,” pp. 36–38.

26 See Emanuel Turczynski, “Die Bukowina,” in Isabel Röskau-Rydel, ed., *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Galizien, Bukowina, Moldau* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1999), pp. 213ff., 321f.; Mariana Hausleitner, *Rumänisierung der Bukowina* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), pp. 369f. About 14,000 more people were resettled than had claimed to be German during the 1939 census. For an in-depth discussion of the resettlement of Germans, see Angrick, “Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte,” pp. 332ff.

Grand Officer of the Order of the Crown in Romania (*Mare Ofițer of the Coroana României*), the second-highest rank of the highest Romanian order.²⁷

Schellhorn sought ways to enable German Jews to leave the country — those who had remained Austrian citizens when Bukovina was annexed by Romania after World War I and had become Germans automatically after the German annexation of Austria in 1938. Against Schellhorn's urgent warning, they requested to go to Germany. So Schellhorn tried in vain (fortunately, in retrospect) to find help at the *Umsiedlungskommission* (Settlement Commission). As a last step he issued German passports without the discriminatory "J" stamp and tried to obtain visas from the Romanian embassy in Moscow with the help of the German ambassador, Friedrich Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, whom he trusted to be understanding.²⁸ This would have allowed the Jews to leave to Romania,²⁹ but the Romanians refused to cooperate.

On this subject, Nelly Baltuch:

I was living in Czernowitz as a German citizen from August 1938 to March 1944... Until December 8, 1940 when the consulate moved to Romania, Consul Schellhorn tried to save us Jews of German citizenship with the greatest humanity and helpfulness. Since the path to our home country was blocked to us, he wanted to help us to get to Romania, issued passports without the discriminatory "J" for us, and sent them by courier to Moscow in order to get the needed visa. Moreover, he tried to save our apartments by putting signs on them marking them as German property. And finally, he took our money with him when he departed and left it at the address in Bucharest we had given him.

His efforts... stood in marked opposition to the general and prescribed attitude towards Jews... he took great risks. Even though his efforts, undertaken at the consul's own initiative and in complete selflessness, were in vain since the inimical circumstances were stronger than his good will, this does not lessen the unusual

27 "Aufzeichnung," p. 45; Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 14.

28 Friedrich Werner Graf von der Schulenburg was sentenced to death for his participation in the attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, and executed on November 2, 1944.

29 Schellhorn, "Aufzeichnung," p. 37; idem, "Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu," p. 119. Affidavit Knittel, March 6, 1956, enclosure 3, to Schellhorn's "Aufzeichnung," original document in Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

nature, humanity and courage of his actions.... I also know that Consul Schellhorn helped not only the German Jews, but also the Jewish population of Czernowitz by putting them on lists and thus saving them from the ghetto and from deportation to the concentration camp.³⁰

Schellhorn convinced the Soviet governor to protect these Jews as “Reich Germans.” Some 150 German Jews remained in 1940; most were deported to Siberia in June 1941.³¹ So, in spite of trying his best, Schellhorn failed. The German Jews were deprived of their German citizenship by an order of November 26, 1941.³²

Even after the Soviet occupation of Northern Bukovina, Germany did not accept the Jewish partner in a marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew for resettlement. The Jewish partner and children had to remain in Bukovina. Such families asked Schellhorn for help. He brought some of them to Jassy on a special consulate train, providing them with passports and listing them as members of the consulate.³³

The Pogrom in Jassy in June 1941

Romania joined Germany's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Schellhorn first witnessed a massacre of Jews from his consular post in Jassy; it began on June 28, 1941, and claimed the lives of thousands of Jews. Schellhorn described in detail his unsuccessful attempts to have Romanian and German authorities intervene in this matter.³⁴ The German General von Salmuth was absent; his Chief of Staff Probst had

30 Nelly Baltuch affidavit, April 25, 1966, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

31 “Aufzeichnung,” p. 36f.; “Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu,” p. 119f. See also Turczynski, “Die Bukowina,” p. 324, who reported a deportation of 3,800 people, four-fifths of them Jews, nine days before the German attack. See also Manfred Reifer, “Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina (1919–1944),” in Hugo Gold, ed., *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Olamenu, 1962) p. 1ff., esp. p. 13, “In der Nacht auf den 13. Juni.”

32 Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 66.

33 As testified, for example, by Hans Prelitsch in his Munich affidavit, July 27, 1951, Spruchkammerakte Dr. Fritz Gebhard Schellhorn, Wü 13 T2 Nr. 2113/061, Landesarchiv Baden Württemberg, Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen (Spruchkammerakte Schellhorn).

34 For a detailed description, see, especially, “Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu,” p. 121ff. An official report, dated July 9, 1941, is in the consulate files (and in Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, p. 184). For further notes by

lost track of the German troops. The Romanian authorities saw no possibility to help. Schellhorn tried to assist together with the renowned Berlin scholar of the Ottoman Empire, Professor Franz Babinger, who had been forced into exile on false accusations that his grandmother had been Jewish. Babinger explains in his 1956 affidavit: “Dr. Schellhorn and I tried to save Jews at our own risk and were sometimes successful. With unprecedented courage Schellhorn saved the lives of some Jews.”³⁵

Schellhorn's July 9, 1941, official report about the pogrom at Jassy, which is in his legacy, describes horrendous things and explicitly takes a stance against what happened.³⁶ This experience decisively influenced Schellhorn's actions in the months to come. Having closely watched the pogrom and the deportations at Jassy, when the turn of the Jews in Czernowitz came to be deported, he had a clear idea of what would happen to them.³⁷

Sonderkommando 10b, Czernowitz, July 1941

The Third Romanian Army invaded Czernowitz on July 5, followed by *Sonderkommando 10b* of Einsatzgruppe D. During the invasion and in the following days perhaps thousands of Jews were murdered by the *Sonderkommando*, the Romanian army, and local civilians. Schellhorn asked for a report of the *Sonderkommando*'s activities, according to which it had murdered 524 people at the beginning of July 1941.³⁸ SK-10b

Schellhorn concerning the pogrom in Jassy, see Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, pp. 162, 168, 175, 181, 184.

35 Dated February 20, 1956, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9. See also Ottmar Trașcă, “Franz Babinger și pogromul din Iași (1941),” *Archiva Moldaviae*, I (2009), Arhivele Naționale Ale României Iași, pp. 219–226. See also Gerhard Grimm, “Franz Babinger (1891–1967) ein lebensgeschichtlicher Essay,” *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 38 (1998), p. 325. Babinger was also in contact with the Abwehr, whose chief, Admiral Canaris, was involved in the attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20, 1944, and was hanged.

36 Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 14. Angrick says that “one could even think that it [the consulate] was trying to do justice to these people, at least to some extent”; Angrick, “Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte,” p. 349.

37 Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania* (Lincoln and Jerusalem: University of Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, 2011), p. 244; Isak Weissglas, “Ghetto und Deportation,” in Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, ed., *Czernowitz. Jüdisches Städtebild* (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 1998), p. 275.

38 Schellhorn, “Aufzeichnung,” p. 56. Schellhorn's memory was excellent, according to Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord. Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941–43* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), p. 155, n. 90;

commander, SS-Obersturmbannführer Alois Persterer, reported on July 9 that the unit, “together with the police and the Romanian armed forces,” had shot more than 500 Jews. The estimate of the number of Jewish victims of the Romanian army and of civilians in the surroundings of Czernowitz is considerably higher, but these events are not the subject of this article.³⁹

SK-10b went on with the murder for approximately ten days and then ceased,⁴⁰ even though there were still about 50,000 Jews in Czernowitz. After that the *Sonderkommando* remained in town for several weeks.⁴¹

The cessation of the murders by the *Sonderkommando* several weeks before it withdrew from Czernowitz has several conceivable explanations. It is possible that their initial mission was accomplished. At the beginning of the Eastern campaign, mainly “Jewish-Bolshevik” elites as well as “radical elements” (e.g., saboteurs, etc.) were targeted.⁴² The head of the SK reported that “it was possible to catch [and murder — H.C.]

Andrej Angrick, et al., eds., *Deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der UdSSR 1941–1945: Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion II* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013), p. 51, doc. 17.

39 On that topic see International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*, November 11, 2004, at <http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1117716572750>. See also Simon Geissbühler, *Blutiger Juli — Rumäniens Vernichtungskrieg und der vergessene Massenmord an den Juden 1941* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2013).

40 Klaus Michael Mallmann, et al., eds., *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR” 1941. Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), reports 19 and 22, pp. 102–108, 117–120. Ancel relates to “the last report on Czernowitz,” which refers to 1,106 Jews and thirty-four Communists shot to death in and around the city by late August 1941; *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 273. This “last report” was *Ereignismeldung* 67, dated August 29, 1941 (Mallmann, et al., eds., *Ereignismeldungen UdSSR 1941*, p. 378), which also relates to the murder unit’s July 14 report (*Ereignismeldung* 22, *ibid.*, pp. 117–120).

41 Schellhorn, “Aufzeichnung,” p. 56; the *Sonderkommando* withdrew from Czernowitz at the end of July: Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord*, pp. 155–162; *idem*, “Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte,” p. 340.

42 Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord*, p. 149; Christian Ingrao, *Hitlers Elite. Die Wegbereiter des nationalsozialistischen Massenmordes* (Bonn: Propyläen, 2012), p. 223; Bert Hoppe and Hildrun Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945*, Volume 7: *Sowjetunion mit annektierten Gebieten I* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), Introduction, p. 32f.

the Jewish elites almost entirely.”⁴³ The Romanians are also suspected of having given their consent only temporarily,⁴⁴ and the end of the murders could have resulted from a change in Romanian government policies.⁴⁵ However, there is no hint that the Romanian government sought to stop the murder.

The fact is that Schellhorn claimed that it was he who had brought about the end of the murders by the *Sonderkommando*.⁴⁶ According to Schellhorn, upon learning of SK-10b's operation, he traveled from his office in Jassy to Czernowitz in order to intervene.⁴⁷ He made the argument to the SK-10b's commander that he was not acting in enemy territory, but, on the contrary, the SK had acted sovereignly in friendly Romania — something that was bound to lead to political repercussions. He countered the objection that the Romanian government had agreed to the murder by stating that this was a question of political sovereignty. Particularly Ion Antonescu, with whom Schellhorn was well acquainted, had been very sensitive about that. Schellhorn also told the commander about the Romanian authorities' displeasure, of which he had been informed by the governor of Bukovina, Riosanu.⁴⁸ These arguments, Schellhorn claimed, helped him effectuate the cessation of the murders by SK-10b in Czernowitz.⁴⁹

Ereignismeldung No. 22 of July 14, 1941, states that the Romanians

43 Hoppe and Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden*, vol. 7, doc. 285.

44 Andrej Angrick, “Die Einsatzgruppe D und die Kollaboration,” in Wolf Kaiser, ed., *Der Überfall auf die Sowjetunion und der Völkermord an den Juden* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002), p. 73.

45 In a postwar trial, members of the Einsatzgruppe reported a change in Romanian policies. They could have known this only from the already deceased commander Alois Persterer. See Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord*, p. 155, and idem, “Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte,” pp. 340–344.

46 To date, only Mariana Hausleitner has researched this subject. See her article, “Rettungsaktionen für verfolgte Juden unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bukowina 1941–1944,” in Wolfgang Benz and Brigitte Mihok, eds., *Holocaust an der Peripherie: Judenpolitik und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transnistrien, 1940–1944* (Berlin: Metropol, 2009), p. 118f.

47 Schellhorn could not remember the exact date of his intervention. In “Aufzeichnung” he reported it to have been “in the first days of August” (p. 54); in the more detailed “Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu,” however, he dated it “mid-July,” which might be more accurate.

48 “Aufzeichnung,” p. 55. However, the Romanian authorities had not opposed the *Sonderkommando*.

49 Ibid., pp. 54–56.

had declared Northern Bukovina Romanian territory.⁵⁰ This may have been the reason that the *Sonderkommando* ceased its murder activities. In fact, Romania declared this annexation only on September 3,⁵¹ but a Romanian administration had already been installed. It would certainly not have forestalled its government.

The commando stuck exactly to Schellhorn's remarks. It no longer acted "sovereignly" toward the population and so ceased to murder on its own. However, the Einsatzgruppe did not consider the murder orders to have yet been fulfilled. Consequently, the commando was instructed "to convince the Romanian authorities to act more forcefully regarding the Jewish question." "In order to be able to intervene itself," it was supposed "to unveil any plots and to initiate Romanian actions against the Jewish intelligentsia."⁵² The commando now set out to investigate German [!] thieves.⁵³

Schellhorn's account explains these facts without any further discussion. Schellhorn also received SK-10b's report on its work. He handed it personally to the envoy von Killinger, who read it without reaction and locked it in his personal safe.⁵⁴

Schellhorn's efforts did become known, as evidenced in the March 20, 1965, affidavit submitted by Waldemar Salter, an ethnic German who had been married to a Jewish woman.

Directly after the arrival of the Consul in Cernowitz (July 1941) the persecutions and mass murders of the Jews by the *SD-Sturmkommando* were interrupted. Everyone in the city knew that this was solely due to the Consul's intervention and also that he had done this out of pure philanthropy and his high sense of law and justice. He risked his position and his life through his actions.⁵⁵

50 Mallmann, ed., *"Ereignismeldungen UdSSR" 1941*, Ereignismeldung 22, July 14, 1941, p. 118; see also Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 18; and Hoppe and Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden*, Volume 7, Introduction, p. 36.

51 Hiltrun Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden im rumänischen Machtbereich* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), p. 99. The Romanian government delayed the annexation in order to preserve the legal status of "*occupatio bellica*," which facilitated the displacement of Jews; *ibid.*, p. 111.

52 Mallmann, ed., *Die "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR" 1941*, Ereignismeldung 22, July 14, 1941, p. 118.

53 Angrick, "Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte," p. 340; *idem*, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord*, p. 161.

54 "Aufzeichnung," p. 56.

55 Waldemar Salter affidavit, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

The Deportations from Czernowitz, October 1941

The Romanian government began deporting the Jews from Northern Bukovina (as well as Southern Bukovina, which had not been ceded to the Soviet Union)⁵⁶ and Bessarabia to the East, especially Transnistria, in October 1941, by order of Marshal Ion Antonescu. About two-thirds of the deported people died, whether from starvation, freezing to death, exhaustion, or shooting.⁵⁷

The Czernowitz ghetto was created on October 11, and the first 3,000 Jews were deported on October 13. Two days later Antonescu personally ordered the discontinuation of the deportations from Czernowitz. For the time being, 20,000 economically vital Jews were to stay behind until Romanian replacements could be brought there. As Antonescu gave that order to Bukovina Governor Corneliu Calotescu, the Jews were permitted to remain on the basis of so-called “Calotescu-authorizations” signed by the governor.⁵⁸ The “authorizations” confirmed the economic importance of these people, and in the following months there were regular checks to see if these persons were still indispensable — obviously in order to deport those who were dispensable after all.⁵⁹

Antonescu's October 15 order to exempt 20,000 Jews from deportation was the main basis for sparing the Jews in Czernowitz.⁶⁰ These

56 Romania acquired Southern Bukovina after World War I, but it was not part of the Old Kingdom (the “*Regat*”), from which Romania did not deport Jews in the end.

57 Memorandum by Gustav Richter, October 17, 1941, noting that Radu Lecca, the Romanian commissioner for Jewish Affairs, saw the liquidation of those Jews as the goal of that action; Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 58. Hildrun Glass concurs on the facts of the deportations, but doubts that this document proves the intention of annihilation; Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*, p. 145f.

58 Traian Popovici, in Matatias Carp, *Cartea Neagra: Suferintele Evreilor din Romania, 1940–1944*, vol. 3 (Bucharest: Diogene, 1996), doc. 100: Cernăuți 1941 Prigoana, Ghetoul și deportarea; in German as “Mein Bekenntnis,” in Gold, ed., *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, vol. 2, p. 66f.

59 Schellhorn report to the legacy, April 17, 1942; Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 78. Corneliu Calotescu, a Romanian general, was governor of Bukovina in 1941–1943. According to Reifer, “Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina (1919–1944),” p. 20, Calotescu became governor only in early October, i.e., only few days before.

60 The sources vary regarding the number exempted from deportation that day. Schellhorn wrote that he learned, on October 15, of “exceptions for about 500 persons”; Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 54. Another source says Antonescu decided in early September to spare 550 heads of family (about 2,500 people). The 20,000 referred to by Antonescu were in addition to these. See Angrick, “Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte,” p. 350; Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der*

events have been described by scholars such as Andrej Angrick,⁶¹ Jean Ancel,⁶² Mariana Hausleitner,⁶³ and most recently Hildrun Glass,⁶⁴ and they provide various answers to the question of how Antonescu's October 15 order came about. On the basis of his own account, Traian Popovici, the mayor of Czernowitz, is mainly assumed to have brought about that decision.⁶⁵ For example, on Yad Vashem's website it states:

In his memoirs Popovici said that he contemplated stepping down, but was determined not to abandon the Jews in their time of need. Disregarding the risk to his person, he continued to protest to the governor and to Antonescu, arguing that the Jews were vital to the economic stability of the town. His ruse succeeded, and he was ordered to draw lists of 20,000 Jews within four days. The Jews who received the exemption from deportation were allowed to return to their homes. Popovici distributed authorizations to Jews — well above the quota he was given, and to people who had no professional skills whatsoever.⁶⁶

Schellhorn's account that he had been the source of Antonescu's order to stop the deportations and allow 20,000 Jews to remain behind has been noted in the research literature for some years now, especially since his "*Aufzeichnung*" about his time in Romania became known. Schellhorn's version has not been contested, and his support has been acknowledged. However, his intervention is not generally assumed to be the reason that 20,000 Jews were saved from deportation.⁶⁷

Juden, p. 136. Mayor Popovici said that Governor Calotescu had granted him a maximum of 100–200 exceptions; Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," p. 66. These decisions may already have been carried out by Popovici. A letter of permission by him, dated October 11, to stay in Czernowitz — i.e., the "Popovici-authorization" — is in Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," p. 67. However, since the date is printed on the form and not filled in by hand, unlike the personal data appearing on the authorizations, it is clearly not a date of issue.

61 See also Ralf Ogorrek, *Die Einsatzgruppen und die Genesis der Endlösung* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996), p. 154f.

62 Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, pp. 270–281.

63 Hausleitner, "Rettungsaktionen für verfolgte Juden," pp. 113–128.

64 Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*, pp. 134–138, 213.

65 Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," pp. 66–68.

66 <https://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/stories/popovici.html>.

67 Armin Heinen, in *Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), p. 134, credits Schellhorn with the Jews being able to remain in the city. Mariana Hausleitner has written the most decisive appraisal of Schellhorn to date. See Hausleitner, "Rettungsaktionen für verfolgte Juden," pp. 113–128. Vladimir

Both Traian Popovici and Fritz Schellhorn each assert that their efforts were the decisive element in having the Jews spared. The governor of Bukovina, Corneliu Calotescu, is also said to have claimed that it was he who was instrumental in the decision. Up until now no such contention has been made for any other person. However, that does not mean that there were no other attempts to influence Antonescu in favor of the Jews. Nevertheless, such endeavors did not prevent the deportations from Bessarabia or the other parts of Bukovina, or the start of the deportations from Czernowitz on October 13, 1941. For example, the efforts of Wilhelm Fildermann, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Greater Romania, did not influence the deportations in Czernowitz.⁶⁸

On September 3, 1941, Antonescu had still told Deputy Prime Minister Mihai Antonescu that he was going to deport all the Jews at once.⁶⁹ He repeated this to his cabinet after the chief of the General Staff had set a ten-day deadline.⁷⁰ Further attempts to persuade Antonescu thus must have referred specifically to Czernowitz, the only place in Northern Bukovina or Bessarabia from which a large number of Jews survived.⁷¹ Moreover, these efforts must have been made in the brief period of October 13–15, 1941, which has not been claimed regarding any other intervention.⁷²

Solonari also believes that it is “almost certain” that Antonescu’s change of policy regarding Czernowitz was influenced by Schellhorn. See Vladimir Solonari, “The Treatment of the Jews of Bukovina by the Soviet and Romanian Administrations 1940–1944,” *Holocaust and Modernity*, no. 2 (8) (2010), p. 170f., and idem, *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania* (Washington, DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 215–221. In contrast, Hildrun Glass, believes that it is still not possible to determine which intervention most influenced Antonescu’s October 15 decision; Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*, pp. 136, 213.

68 Cremers, “Generalkonsul Dr. Dr. Fritz Gebhard Schellhorn,” p. 138, n. 43.

69 Hoppe and Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden*, doc. 295.

70 Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 244.

71 Ibid., p. 231, Table 4.

72 Ancel attributes Antonescu’s decision both “to the fact that the Jews were necessary for Czernowitz’s rehabilitation” and to pressure by the Germans “to put an end to the unruly and unplanned deportations”; ibid., p. 280. However, he does not provide any proof for this claim. The Germans’ objections to the “unruly” deportations referred to the deportations from Transnistria via the Bug River to *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine. See Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, docs. 73, 74, 75, 76.

Traian Popovici's Account

Traian Popovici's own account is considered to be the most important source for his claim that his attempts brought about Antonescu's decision.⁷³ Further details on the origin and genesis of his manuscript, the date of its composition, and the circumstances under which it was written are not known. Its authenticity may be credible, yet it has not been proven. A German version (an extract of the original text), translated by Hermann Sternberg, was published in 1962, as "*Mein Bekenntnis*." This version has been used as the source in this article.

Popovici describes several meetings during which he stood up for the Jews, opposing all others present. Unlike his other efforts, Popovici does not present any of his actions as having possibly led to Antonescu's decision. He mentioned only two negative remarks about his efforts: they had been "indirect"; and he had attempted to express his support by "means" that had not been "opportune" to mention. "Indirect" means that it was not he who spoke to Antonescu, but Popovici does not say who did speak to him. He also does not give any details about the "means" and arguments by which those intermediaries supposedly brought about Antonescu's change of heart. Nor does he give hints as to why it may not have been opportune after the war to disclose those ways and means.

Popovici's statement is imprecise. It does not contain any facts that can be proven or disproven — for example, by Calotescu, who was still alive and knew about the course of events. Popovici's description of how Calotescu made Antonescu's decision known differs from Schellhorn's version regarding why Schellhorn did not participate in the selection of those to be spared and those to be deported. Popovici claimed that Calotescu invited Schellhorn to participate, but the latter declined. This is implausible. It was not appropriate for Schellhorn to take part in this purely Romanian decision. Popovici may have invented this story in order to explain why Calotescu had invited Schellhorn; that is, to evade the true explanation — that Schellhorn had brought about the decision.

In his extensive presentation of his story, Popovici did not mention the economic reason for not deporting the Jews nor the tentative character of the decision until Romanian replacements could arrive. However, it would seem obvious that Popovici used the economic argument since,

73 Carp, *Cartea Neagra*, vol. 3, doc. 100: Cernăuți 1941 Prigoana, Ghetoul și deportarea.

as mayor of Czernowitz, he was responsible for the city's economic fate. On the other hand, that argument might not have been "opportune" in postwar Romania, when "*Mein Bekenntnis*" was probably written. An argument of this nature could have caused Popovici to be confronted with charges that he had been interested only in economically stabilizing Antonescu's regime during warfare. The ethical arguments that Popovici claimed to have made were more opportune in the postwar situation, but they would hardly have been appropriate in 1941.

Popovici was suspended as mayor at the beginning of June 1942, probably as an act of revenge by Stere Marinescu, Calotescu's head of cabinet, who was quite fierce in persecuting Jews.⁷⁴

Fritz Schellhorn's Account

On 12 October [1941], i.e. one day after the Czernowitz Jews had been brought to the ghetto, I received a call [in Jassy] from Czernowitz, from the director of the local Romanian credit bank, a gentleman [Emanuel Ritter] von Tabora⁷⁵ I had been friends with for years and who implored me to come to Czernowitz at once. I was the only man who could help. Terrible things were happening in the city... I immediately thought of new actions against the Jews and went to Czernowitz with two employees on 14 October. I arrived in the city in the early afternoon and immediately contacted the gentleman von Tabora... I was deeply perturbed to hear that all Bukovinian Jews were to be deported; in the province, this procedure had already been completed and had been done suddenly; now it was Czernowitz's turn as the last city. All Jews had been brought to a ghetto to be deported from there...

How should I take action against measures decided by the Romanian government which could be sure of the approval of the German authorities that were equally concerned with a solution to the Jewish question? Especially in an antisemitic country with a bleak history of bloody excesses against Jews only a short time

⁷⁴ Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 280f. According to other sources, he resigned already at the end of December 1941. On the petition, see Hoppe and Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden*, doc. 314.

⁷⁵ Von Tabora confirmed that he made this call to Iași, Declaration of April 4, 1966, notary Günther Sido, Frankfurt, UR 33/66, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

ago? My actions were also my own responsibility; had I beforehand tried to get clearance from the German envoy von Killinger, this would, given his attitude in the Jewish question, certainly have resulted in the failure of the attempt. After all, I also had to think about the very serious consequences that unauthorized acting for the rescue of Jews could have for my own life in the circumstances at that time...it seemed to me that the only feasible way to save as many Jews as possible from Czernowitz from being deported was to emphasize the economic and especially military benefits for Germany if the Jews were to remain in the city. First I tried to move the two German administration advisors Pflaumer and Ellgering to protest together against the deportation of the Jews. The two gentlemen expressed some understanding for my arguments but declined any participation in the steps I had in mind.⁷⁶ I let Dr. Lupu,⁷⁷ a traditional Austrian civil servant, whom I knew very well, know about this issue and asked him to act as an interpreter with Calotescu. Calotescu was not able to understand German, and I would have had to converse with him in French. To avoid any kind of misunderstanding in this important affair, I preferred to work with an interpreter in the form of a senior Romanian government official. Dr. Lupu, whose opinion concerning questions of deportation was similar to mine, readily agreed. It may have been about 11 o'clock [on October 15] when we entered the governor's room. I explained everything that could be seen as fatal consequences of the deportations to Calotescu; I showed the future of Bukovina in the darkest colors and pointed out that with its economic collapse, which could certainly be expected, German interests would also be harmed gravely. I especially pointed out the strategic necessity for smooth supply from the Bukovina to the Reich and the front lines. Finally, I protested, as an advocate of the interests of the Reich, against further deportations of Jews.

The governor listened to my explanations with growing astonishment; obviously, he hadn't expected something like this from a German official. However, he didn't repudiate my protest; he only

76 About this attempt, notes by Schellhorn, October 15, 1941, can also be found in the PAAA, Akten des Konsulats.

77 On Nicolae Lupu (1884–1972), see Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, p. 212, n. 3. According to Angrick, "Im Wechselspiel der Kräfte," p. 347, Lupu was "inspector general for Bukovina."

said that he could not make a decision right then; at first, I was to hand in, by 6 p.m., a list of those Jews who were important to protect the German interests I had mentioned... after the meeting, the governor would certainly deliberate with Antonescu....

I met the mayor Dr. Popovici and other gentlemen in the governor's antechamber at the time in the afternoon he had determined. As they told me, they had been asked by the governor to be present at 6 o'clock in the evening; they did not, however, know for what reasons... I went to the governor to give him my list, but he waved me aside and addressed me in French: He had informed Marshal Antonescu, who knew me in person — *il vous connaît!* — about my protest and the reasons for it. The marshal as [a] result ordered the evacuation of the Czernowitz Jews to be stopped for the time being. 20,000 should not at all be affected by this evacuation, but rather be selected; after this had been done, the evacuation could be recommenced. He then said I could take back my list and complete it... Subsequently, the governor addressed the other gentlemen and told them what had happened....

...the train ready for departure was unloaded. The city breathed a sigh of relief...⁷⁸

Schellhorn's account is substantiated by his three immediate notes about the proceedings, written the same day, which can be found in the consulate files.⁷⁹ Schellhorn also spoke about it to his circle of friends and acquaintances.

Schellhorn's phrasing in the first note of October 15, about his appeal to the German advisors Karl Pflaumer and Theodor Ellgering, who were in Czernowitz, and his remarks before he spoke to Calotescu betray emotions and do not point to economic aims. Furthermore, it is clear that Schellhorn wanted to suggest that the deportations be abandoned altogether and not merely to select Jews who were indispensable: "what is happening now is sheer madness"; "ought to try everything to undo,

78 Schellhorn, "Aufzeichnung," pp. 58–61; "Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu," pp. 79ff., 128f.

79 Two notes are in Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, docs. 54, 55. For the third see PAAA files of the former German consulate at Czernowitz, package 4, file reference Po9. One of them (Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 54) is formulated as a report to the legation but was not sent.

at least in part, the measures that have been planned”; “one had to try to avert at least the worst.”⁸⁰

Calotescu willingly accepted the memorandum that Schellhorn had given him with reasons for sparing the Jews.⁸¹ Ellgering wrote a report to the German envoy on October 17: “Because of the objection of the German consulate, the number of Jews who are permitted to stay here temporarily is being set at 15,000 – 20,000.”⁸²

In analyzing Schellhorn’s 1941 memos, his dilemma as a German diplomat should be taken into account. Schellhorn had to convince the addressees that it was in their own interest to spare the Jews, while at the same time having to protect himself. He had to show Calotescu that he was acting within the bounds of his responsibilities as a foreign consul, and therefore pointed especially to “German” Jews and employees of German companies. He particularly emphasized Germany’s and Romania’s common commercial interests; for example, the fact that Czernowitz made it possible to avoid trade through Hungary. He noted that Jews achieved extraordinary results in trade, and, in preparation for their own banishment, they were supposed to teach Romanians the necessary skills. In order to do that, they had to remain in Czernowitz.

Schellhorn also had to prevent the German legation from undoing his efforts after he had acted on his own accord and after it had already been decided to spare the Jews. His October 28, 1941, report to the legation, with a detailed account of what had happened, related the events in such a way as to achieve this.⁸³ Schellhorn admitted to having wondered whether “the Romanian measures had...in general been done with our knowledge and consequently had to be accepted.” This seemed possible to him only if Germany assumed the administration of Bukovina on its own, which, according to the information procured by the German advisors Pflaumer and Ellgering, was not the case. Bukovina was about to “lose not only the [already lost] Germans — among them the most able farmers and the most skilled woodworkers,” but also “those responsible

80 PAAA files of the former German consulate at Czernowitz, package 4, file reference Po9.

81 See Schellhorn’s October 16, 1941 memo, Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 56.

82 Ibid., doc. 57.

83 PAAA files of the former German consulate in Czernowitz, package 4, file reference Po9. The seven-page report is marked “Secret.” All quotations from the report are from this source.

for commerce and industry, just as well as skilled workers and craftsmen, almost completely; furthermore, the majority of free professions and a considerable percentage of workers.”

Schellhorn calculated the total loss of people useful to Germany to be 250,000. “To make matters worse, Ukrainians, who represent the vast majority of the non-Jewish population in Northern Bukovina, are suffering discrimination.” Finally, Schellhorn stated several times that the government’s measures were “harshly criticized by all reasonable Romanians,” but he also noted that “there had been no protests filed to the highest Romanian authorities up to now.”

Schellhorn scathingly criticized Germany’s Romanian allies, whose behavior justified labeling his report “Secret.” The instructions had been “carried out without any kind of preparation, with incomprehensible haste and unprecedented brutality.”

What happened after the Jews had been brought to the ghetto at Czernowitz can no longer be understood by German sensibility and shows the gap between German notions of honor and civilized behavior on the one hand, and Romanian interpretation of these notions on the other that can, in my opinion, not be bridged.

Schellhorn describes his own sensibility as “German,” although he knew about the deeds of the Einsatzgruppe. He appealed to envoy von Killinger as a German, and alluded to their common ideals, thus strengthening possible empathy for his approach. His texts to Calotescu and the legation can be understood only when viewed in light of his aim not to jeopardize saving the Jews yet to protect himself. These aims were achieved.⁸⁴

The memo concludes with arguments regarding the economic and military disadvantages of the deportation. The Jews’ deportation would remove them from jobs that contribute to the wealth of the general population. Leaving them in Czernowitz would help save the economy. Schellhorn’s arguments in essence contradict Nazi racial theory in their stress on the Jews’ importance and diligence.

Schellhorn’s relationship with Antonescu and the resulting possibility of exerting influence on him is reflected in the above-mentioned honor that Antonescu bestowed on him in February 1941. As noted above,

84 Envoy von Killinger did not forward Schellhorn’s report to Berlin and thus covered for him. Envoy Neubacher also authorized Schellhorn’s actions later.

Popovici also confirms that Schellhorn was present when Calotescu related his report about Antonescu's decision. Schellhorn's account is not only documented but also plausible. A fierce protest by the German Reich had to force Calotescu to report to Antonescu immediately. The hint about Schellhorn — who was held in high esteem by Antonescu and to whom Antonescu was indebted — being at the source of the protest could well have moved Antonescu to change his mind halfway through the ongoing action. These are the decisive aspects of Schellhorn's efforts, alongside the obvious economic issues.⁸⁵ Other theoretically possible influences probably played a negligible role.

Parts of Antonescu's decision also tally with Schellhorn's suggestions. The economic indispensability reason became part of the selection criteria, according to Popovici's report. However, Schellhorn had not thought of a selection when he assembled his arguments, but rather of an end to the deportations and their reversal. The temporary aspect of having the Jews remain until Romanian substitutes could arrive, which was an essential part of the decision, was also suggested by Schellhorn.⁸⁶ This temporary nature enabled Antonescu to take a decision that was completely opposed to his contention that it was the Jews who were Romania's downfall economically.⁸⁷ As Antonescu said on November 3, 1941: "As long as I live, no-one and nothing can stop me from completing the Cleansing operation."⁸⁸

In the following months there were many enquiries as to whether the remaining Jews were still indispensable.⁸⁹ From Schellhorn's perspective, the Romanian replacements "naturally" must have "failed to appear."⁹⁰ He thus counted upon the Jews staying permanently, which materialized. Eventually a large number of those who had been spared

85 The aspects concerning the economic consequences were certainly voiced quite often, even before the deportations began.

86 Memorandum, Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 56.

87 Antonescu had not abandoned his intention to expel all the Jews, as expressed in his letter to Fildermann justifying the deportations; Carp, *Cartea Neagra*, vol. 3, p. 191, doc. 103. On Antonescu's opinion, see Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, pp. 140–142.

88 Ancel, *ibid.*, p. 245.

89 Schellhorn report, April 17, 1942, Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, 413f.

90 Schellhorn note and docs. 23, 47, *ibid.* The idea of sparing Jews from being deported until Romanian substitutes arrived was not new, while not always expressed in terms of *ad calendas graecas* (see, for instance, Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 34).

were able to stay for good. Moreover, in his closing economic argumentation, Schellhorn emphasized the essential professions of the people. His aim was to leave them where they were and have them work in their professions, not at forced labor.

Calotescu spoke to Antonescu on October 15, 1941, as a result of Schellhorn's intervention. It is unlikely that he would have dared speak against Antonescu's deportation decision, which was already underway, without having any new facts, and certainly not for a bribe from Popovici. Calotescu had obviously been unsuccessful in passing on Ellgering's recommendations to Antonescu on August 23, 1941, to the effect that: "In my opinion the Jews can be deported only once the combat has ceased, at least to a certain degree, and there is a line of demarcation between the allied and the Russian forces."⁹¹

The German consul's initiative forced Calotescu to act. He was successful, but he did not use all 20,000 available authorizations. Neither Popovici nor Calotescu mentioned Schellhorn's support after the war. Calotescu was tried and sentenced to death, but was later pardoned.⁹²

The Deportation of 1941

At the time of the events, Popovici created the impression that he was at the source of attaining the authorizations. Nathan Getzler writes:

In the evening on October 16, the good philanthropist Mayor Dr. Traian Popovici brought the message to the Jewish hospital that he had succeeded in procuring a temporary delay of the deportations. Consequently, a selection of the Jews who were economically indispensable could be made. That message spread like fire...⁹³

The fact that Popovici remained silent in public about Schellhorn's role, in 1941, was probably out of consideration for Schellhorn, as the latter could have been exposed to severe negative consequences for his support for the Jews. Apart from that Popovici was obviously not able to name

91 Hoppe and Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden*, doc. 294.

92 Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, doc. 54, note 2.

93 Nathan Getzler, chief physician in Czernowitz Hospital, "Tagebuchblätter aus Czernowitz und Transnistrien," in Gold, ed., *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, p. 57.

other people, and thus willingly accepted the audience's impression that he had brought about Antonescu's decision.

Manfred Reifer, "the well-known Jewish leader of Czernowitz,"⁹⁴ knew about Schellhorn's work in opposing the deportations and wrote about it in his book, *Menschen und Ideen*. His information on Popovici must have come from Popovici himself as early as 1941/1942, when Reifer was in Czernowitz. Reifer says that Popovici had called on Governor Calotescu and pointed out that, "no wheel in industry would turn anymore if all the Jews were deported," and "he stirred the German consul-general Fritz Schellhorn into action and named him as the person to speak out to the governor against the deportation of the Jews."⁹⁵

Reifer does not mention any further actions by Popovici, and his is the only report about actual measures that Popovici claimed to have taken to spare the Jews. In his memoir Popovici wrote that calling on Calotescu led to sparing "a maximum of 100–200 persons."⁹⁶ Thus, Schellhorn's "motivation" and he being "named" to take the initiative remain the only significant influence on Antonescu's decision that can be attributed to Popovici, according to Reifer.

However, there is no evidence that Popovici influenced Schellhorn, let alone assigned any task to Schellhorn when the latter was staying in Jassy. If Popovici had influenced him, then we would need to explain why Schellhorn incorrectly attributed the phone call and plea for help to von Tabora, or why he forgot Popovici's influence, with whom he was well acquainted and with whom he agreed regarding the deportations. He would also have mentioned Popovici in his "*Aufzeichnung*," had the latter really approached him.

Popovici's only action that was reported and might have influenced Ion Antonescu, at least indirectly, "rallying" Schellhorn to act, could not have happened. His attempts to assume credit for Schellhorn's actions can be explained only by him knowing that success was due to those actions, which means that he confirmed their causality. In any event, it is inconsequential if Popovici had indirectly exerted any kind of influence, for example on von Tabora, or even called Schellhorn at Jassy, since both Tabora and Popovici were aware of Schellhorn's attitude.

Why was the number 20,000 cited in Antonescu's October 15,

94 Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 612, n. 3.

95 Manfred Reifer, *Menschen und Ideen: Erinnerungen* (Tel Aviv: Olympia, 1953), p. 244.

96 Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," p. 66.

1941, decision? It might have been a gesture to Schellhorn based on their prior acquaintance. Antonescu first associated Schellhorn's name with his support for non-Germans during the Soviet occupation in 1940, for which he had highly decorated him. In 1940, 95,770 "Germans" were resettled from Bukovina, approximately 20,000 more than were listed in the last official census in 1930 — 75,533.⁹⁷ Perhaps Antonescu had this number in mind when he came to his decision.

All the evidence points to Schellhorn's efforts having been crucial in sparing 20,000 Jews from the terrible fate of deportation in 1941. Schellhorn was also the only involved party who exceeded his responsibilities by not only protesting to his superiors but also acting deliberately and at great personal risk against his government's policy.

One obvious question is where are the witnesses to Schellhorn's efforts and risk? It seems clear that only Marshal Ion Antonescu and Governor Corneliu Calotescu knew first-hand about Schellhorn's involvement. Antonescu alone was able to know the reasons for his decision. Calotescu, however, knew that Antonescu's decision had been made following his report of Schellhorn's attempt. He passed the information on to Schellhorn and Popovici. According to Popovici, General Vasile Ionescu was also present at the disclosure of the decision, and, according to Schellhorn, Dr. Lupu and "other high-ranking administrative officers" participated. However, there are no known records of this.⁹⁸

It can be assumed that Schellhorn did not make his rescue efforts for Jews public at the time and that he did not publicize the true course of events, even though witnesses reported that his efforts did become known. This story certainly was among the "uncontrollable, continuously fresh news" "spread" in the "exasperated crowd" on October 16, about the delay of the deportations. As Dr. Nathan Getzler put it: "More and more uncontrollable news is being spread."⁹⁹ However, only a few had the kind of first-hand knowledge that was available to Manfred Reifer, and so those who heard it were likely to dismiss it as mere rumor.

Many of those who owed their lives to Schellhorn did not know that he was the one who had saved them. However, there are witnesses

97 Both figures are according to Emanuel Turczynski, "Die Bukowina."

98 Schellhorn, "Aufzeichnung," p. 60. Lupu attended at Schellhorn's request, and Schellhorn wrote that he shared his opinion regarding deportation. Popovici does not mention Lupu in his "Bekanntnis." Maybe he regarded him, just as the other civil servants, as less important.

99 Getzler, "Tagebuchblätter aus Czernowitz und Transnistrien," p. 57.

to Schellhorn's successful assistance to individuals. He did not try to solicit witnesses in order to be honored, but did need them, in addition to his official reports, to counter attacks after the war.

While he was still in the USSR, Schellhorn was tried *in absentia* in a denazification trial in 1951. Although the case was dismissed, during the trial his wife and brother (Paul) looked for witnesses to testify that Schellhorn had always acted honorably. These witness affidavits are part of the trial record.¹⁰⁰ Since he was incarcerated in the USSR at the time, Schellhorn clearly could not have influenced the testimonies in any way.

In 1961, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Schellhorn to compose an official final report on his time in Romania. This is when he wrote his "*Aufzeichnung*." Schellhorn added testimonies from people who had worked in the consulate or in other German public-service institutions in Czernowitz or elsewhere, regardless of their political convictions. The affidavits written on his behalf testify to Schellhorn's efforts regarding numerous individuals. For example, retired Professor Ernst Gamillscheg, a philologist at the University of Tübingen, who had been in Bucharest in 1940–1944, wrote:

...He also helped Jewish individuals whenever he could, even risking his own life. Thus, he enabled the widow of the deceased Professor Eugen Herzog, a full Jew, to go to Bucharest and thereby saved her from the deportation to a ghetto.¹⁰¹

Dr. Paul Adams, who managed two Romanian stock companies in Czernowitz, testified to Schellhorn's assistance to the Schusterowitsch family, who were Jewish and had Latvian citizenship.

Dr. Schellhorn used this, since Latvia had already been occupied by German troops, so that he could place Latvian citizens under his protection and put regular German stamps on the Latvian passports, thereby making them valid...In this way the family Schusterowitsch was saved from deportation. The family Schusterowitsch is living in London today [1951].¹⁰²

Adams also reported on Schellhorn's assistance in getting seventeen of

100 Spruchkammerakte Schellhorn.

101 Affidavit, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

102 Spruchkammerakte Schellhorn.

Adams's employees recognized as necessary skilled laborers without asking for or receiving anything in return.¹⁰³

Wenzel Eugen von Mühldorf, a former bookseller in Czernowitz, wrote on May 3, 1966:

...from the time of my work there I know that Consul-General Dr. Schellhorn tried repeatedly to help the Jews. He also saved my two Jewish employees from deportation and thus certain death. The addresses today are:

Mrs. Alice Zappler, Vienna...

Mr. Schlomo Kahn, Kiryat-Chaim Israel...¹⁰⁴

Alice Zappler wrote on April 16, 1966:

I was born a Jew in Czernowitz, Bukovina, in 1903 and lived there until 1946 as a Romanian citizen...

Dr. Dr. Fritz G. Schellhorn returned to Czernowitz in the summer of 1941, which was to be a stroke of luck for many Jews. In October 1941, all Jews were driven into a tightly guarded ghetto, and after a census that showed ca. 50,000 Jews, about 30,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria, while the rest were given permission to continue living in Czernowitz.... Among the Jews saved by... Schellhorn was my own brother Eduard Weich, his wife Anna and son Ernst, who are now living in Israel.

Because of my race I could not continue to work as a bank accountant, neither was I permitted to work as an assistant in Mr. Mühldorf's bookstore in order to spare my family the worst. I know that... Schellhorn frequently defended Mr. Mühldorf against the German and Romanian institutions and helped him to give work to not only me, but also several other Jews and thus help us to survive... It was generally known in our city that... Schellhorn helped the Jews as far as he could in a completely unselfish way.¹⁰⁵

The 1951 affidavit by Gertrud Bindewald, Schellhorn's secretary from 1938 to 1944, should also be noted.¹⁰⁶ Her sister Otilie married

103 Ibid. See also Waldemar Salter's affidavit on Schellhorn saving "thousands of Jewish families" from deportation to Transnistria, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

104 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 9.

105 Ibid. See also the affidavits by Nelly Baltuch and Dr. Artur Zucker, *ibid.*

106 Spruchkammerakte Schellhorn. She married the author's widowed father in 1955.

Schellhorn in 1942. Gertrud's affidavit describes in detail the deeds that Schellhorn later spoke of in his reports and to which she was a direct witness and in which she had participated. Schellhorn did not add her statement to his "*Aufzeichnung*" because Gertrud Bindewald was his sister-in-law. Although clearly her affidavit could have been influenced by her relationship to him, Gertrud Bindewald had not been in contact with Schellhorn since 1944, and thus could not have coordinated the story with him at the time when he was in a Soviet prison.

Many people did not find out to whom they owed their lives since Schellhorn met few of them personally. Other people who knew about the source of their survival still suffered a difficult fate and had more important concerns than looking for their rescuer, who was not easy to find for many years. But some remembered. For example, Isaak Laster, who was hidden in the consul's carport for two weeks and was brought food by the consul's chauffeur, wrote movingly about this, in 1972, in the Basel paper, *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*.¹⁰⁷

Events After November 15, 1941

By November 15, about 30,000 Jews had been deported,¹⁰⁸ and about 16–17,000 who were deemed economically indispensable had been selected to stay. Then Antonescu ordered the deportations called off.¹⁰⁹ The selection of people who were economically important was not continued afterward, a decision that was taken by the mayor.¹¹⁰ According

See also the December 14, 1941, letter by Dr. Oskar Schwind from Transnistria to his former teacher in Czernowitz, hoping that Ottilie and Gertrud's mother would intervene with Schellhorn on his behalf; Benjamin M. Grilj, ed., *Schwarze Milch: Zurückgehaltene Briefe aus den Todeslagern Transnistriens* (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2013), pp. 173–174.

107 *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, February 11, 1972.

Irmfried Heitner and his wife planted a tree in Israel in Schellhorn's honor on March 1, 1971. See the Jewish National Fund certificate, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 14.

108 Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 244; for a detailed account, see *ibid.*, p. 279f. Notes by Schellhorn and Popovici agree that Antonescu ordered the deportations to be discontinued until the 20,000 had been selected, but that was not carried out.

109 For a more detailed account on how this decision was taken, see Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*, p. 146; Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 280. The figures are according to the latter.

110 Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," p. 69.

to Antonescu's October 15 order, more than 3,000 additional authorizations for economically important Jews could have been distributed, but that number was not completely utilized.

The strain that such a selection meant is described in detail by Isak Weißglas;¹¹¹ Popovici mentioned only relief.¹¹² This strain may also explain why Popovici ceased the selection when the deportations were halted on November 15. The ghetto was also closed at this time. Antonescu's order was carried out by Popovici with about 3–5,000 "Popovici-authorizations." Still, Popovici's authorizations were ratified by General Ionescu's review commission.¹¹³ It is unlikely that Calotescu missed these authorizations or that they were implemented against his will, and Popovici did not claim that he faced reproaches because of them.¹¹⁴ Without the decisions that were taken by the people in charge,¹¹⁵ the Popovici-authorizations could not have been effective. And the criteria by which Popovici distributed his authorizations remain to be determined. In any case he did not issue them to all those who did not obtain a Calotescu-authorization. The fact that the government called off the deportations from Czernowitz in November 1941, had nothing to do with Popovici's authorizations.

According to Schellhorn's reports, about 5,000 people were deported in three transports between June 4 and July 6, 1942.¹¹⁶ "In many cases, I succeeded in exempting certain Jews who had already been chosen for deportation; Calotescu normally complied with my requests."¹¹⁷ "The consulate was able [in June 1942] to exempt hundreds of Jews from the measures."¹¹⁸ In the autumn of 1942, Antonescu ceased the deportations because of the war situation, despite German offers to take the Romanian Jews into the German occupation zone; that is, to murder them.

111 Weissglas, "Ghetto und Deportation," p. 275.

112 Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," p. 68.

113 Ancel, *History of the Holocaust in Romania*, p. 280.

114 Popovici, "Mein Bekenntnis," p. 69.

115 According to Popovici's report, Calotescu authorized a maximum of 200 people.

116 Those deportations are described in depth in Weissglas, "Ghetto und Deportation." Reports and notes by Schellhorn on these deportations, in Trașcă and Deletant, eds., *Al III-lea Reich*, docs. 82, 84, 86, 89–90; Romanian report of July 1, 1942, in Hoppe and Glass, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden*, doc. 324.

117 "Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu," p. 130.

118 Fritz Schellhorn, "Das Auswärtige Amt und die Judenpolitik des Nationalsozialismus," 1966, typescript, Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 3, unpublished, p. 130.

The exact number of those who were not deported in 1941 as a result of Schellhorn's actions cannot be determined, but could realistically be estimated at about 16,000.

After the War

In March 1944, with the advance of the Red Army, the consulate left Czernowitz. Schellhorn and Gertrud Bindewald were integrated into the legation in Bucharest. On September 2, 1944, the legation's personnel were captured by Romanians and then handed over to the Soviets. Schellhorn was released only in 1955. He left a matter-of-fact account of this period: the conditions of his arrest; the hunger and cold; the tiny space in overcrowded prison cells; the interrogations; and a twenty-five-year sentence for "espionage" not based on any evidence. He heard no word from his wife and newborn daughter, whom he had seen off on a train to an uncertain future. His notes on the time in the Lefortovo District in Moscow and in Vladimir mention the exchange of ideas with fellow prisoners, but they do not contain any names or details. He only reported the testimony of Colonel Rodler, head of the German Abwehr in Romania, which an interrogator read to him: In 1943, he, Schellhorn, had already talked about the necessity to get rid of National Socialism in order to avert a catastrophe for the German people.¹¹⁹ This talk had taken place in a café in Bucharest. Many death sentences were issued during the war because of such statements.

Popovici's "*Bekanntnis*" (1944 or 1945) and Schellhorn's Postwar Records

When Popovici wrote his "*Bekanntnis*" (*Confession*) apparently about three years after the events, he was in a delicate position. He was the former mayor of an important city under the regime with which accounts were settled after the war. He was in need both of merits and advocates. It is clear that Popovici referred to the same story Reifer told. Praising Germans (in this case, Schellhorn) publicly, in 1944–1945, would have been unwise and raise suspicions of having collaborated with the enemy. The fact that the collaboration had been in order to save lives was irrelevant at that time.

119 "Aufzeichnung," p. 68.

The account was not meant as a personal message to a prominent concerned person, like Reifer, but was written for an unspecified audience. Only Schellhorn could have contested the details, but he was in a Soviet prison. Popovici knew Schellhorn and his stance toward the persecution of Jews, and of his rescue activity. He may have been reluctant to wrongly claim in writing and in public that he had arranged for Fritz Schellhorn, whom he highly esteemed, to act. Popovici omitted the name Schellhorn from his account and attributed credit for Antonescu's decision to himself: "my" attempts were successful.

Popovici died in 1946, so his "*Bekenntnis*" remains his only substantial testimony. When writing this defense, he was probably unaware that it would later be the basis for historical research. And Schellhorn could not speak about his activities until his release from Soviet captivity in 1955.

In 1961, Schellhorn wrote his "*Aufzeichnung*."¹²⁰ Six affidavits from officials in state institutions were attached to the document.

In 1965/66, a Mr. Stettner sued for restitution for his lost possessions in his apartment in Czernowitz.¹²¹ He had been deported to Transnistria, and, after returning, he found his flat destroyed and robbed. He alleged that this was the result of the decision by Schellhorn's deputy, Mr. Springer, to give the flat to a SS officer.

In his reports against Schellhorn, Stettner claimed that Schellhorn thought not enough Jews had been killed, and that he was among those directly responsible for the crimes against Jews. Schellhorn said those accusations were complete lies. He had been devastated by the crimes against the Jews, and any claims that he had participated in those actions greatly hurt his honor. In his allegations Stettner referred to the statements made by Popovici and Sternberg.

Schellhorn learned of Popovici's account in Hugo Gold's *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, translated into German and annotated by Hermann Sternberg, in 1966. Popovici stated that Calotescu had asked Schellhorn to take part in the selection, which Schellhorn declined as a representative of a foreign state. Popovici can be understood as saying

120 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 4 and 5

121 Landesarchiv Berlin Wiedergutmachungsakte Stettner 15/12 WGA 6342/57. Schellhorn filed a complaint against Mr. S, but no case was brought for lack of public interest; Public Prosecutor's Office, Tübingen Az. 14 Js C 3160/65, decision of the attorney general with the higher regional court, Stuttgart, July 27, 1966, over Schellhorn's complaint (Zs 588/66).

that Schellhorn had refused to participate in saving at least some of the people concerned, but it seems more plausible that Schellhorn did not want to participate in the general selection, including the decisions against certain individuals. Schellhorn's idea was that all people were indispensable, but when he did make specific recommendations, he did so directly to Calotescu and was usually successful.

Schellhorn read from the account and the commentary that he was responsible for supervising the Romanian actions against Jews,¹²² and therefore he was primarily accountable for what had transpired. Moreover, he had acted according to the order to pursue the elimination of all Jews without exception and thus to make sure none were exempted.

Schellhorn tried to voice his strong objections to this version by giving an exact depiction of his efforts to the Central Council of Jews in Germany on July 5, 1967. The Central Council wrote, on February 7, 1968, that it was not competent to deal with an affair such as this. Today this correspondence is also available in the Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹²³

What hurt Schellhorn so deeply was the accusation that he had participated in the cruelties and moreover from a position of responsibility. In this context Schellhorn again asked for affidavits and also received them.

Probably because of his "*Aufzeichnung*," in 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Schellhorn to write an expert report about the involvement of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the persecution of Jews, considering Schellhorn an uninvolved expert. The report, "*Das Auswärtige Amt und die Judenpolitik des Nationalsozialismus*,"¹²⁴ contains another short account of his mission.

Schellhorn as a Witness

Various Jewish people from Czernowitz remembered Schellhorn and sought his help with their reparations demands. For example, the lawyer Dr. K.M. wrote from Vienna on February 28, 1957:

122 Gold, ed., *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, p. 70, n. 11.

123 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 5 (typescript).

124 The typescript is in Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 3.

Dear Consul,

All those who remember your work as Consul in Czernowitz still remember with much gratitude the fact that you held onto humanity in those darkest days for the Jews and that you gave help to many of those endangered as long as you had any possibility... assuming that the man who showed courage and the will to humanity back then will also strive for historical truth in these times, I, as a lawyer of the Bukovinian Jews, write to you...¹²⁵

There was not much public response to these legal proceedings, nor did Schellhorn try to use his statements in civil cases to make his own merits known. Schellhorn's statements about these questions contributed to the success of some lawsuits;¹²⁶ in other circumstances they caused the case to be dismissed, which Schellhorn regretted.¹²⁷

Schellhorn was also a witness in criminal cases,¹²⁸ which were concerned with uncovering crimes — but not in uncovering the prevention of crimes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a copy of Schellhorn's "Aufzeichnung" to the Prosecutor's Office München I.¹²⁹

***"Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu.
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Judenverfolgung in
Rumänien"***

When he was in his eighties, Schellhorn planned to write a summary of his experiences. The 158-page typed draft, "Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Judenverfolgung in Rumänien," was not published, but is contained among his papers in

125 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 2, folder 4. See also the 1972 letter from the lawyer Dr. S.L. in *ibid.*, order signature 7, folder 4.

126 The lawyer H.C. Bremen wrote to Schellhorn in connection to a restitution trial on January 27, 1968: "...Your statement was decisive. I would like to also thank you in the name of Mrs. S.H."; Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 7, folder 3.

127 For example, in his letter to N.G., dated March 18, 1970: see Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 7, folder 2.

128 See Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*, p. 137, for an example of a 1968 criminal case.

129 File number 22Js 203/61 = 111Ks/71. It is not clear if the record still exists in the file, as the files of the case cannot be accessed at the moment due to further investigations; Note of the Prosecutor's Office München I, February 1, 2014. Thus, Schellhorn's testimony in this case could not be consulted. See also Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord*, p. 155, n. 90, and p. 159, n. 104.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹³⁰ It includes the most detailed discussion of Schellhorn's interventions.

In this context Schellhorn said positive things about Popovici: "despite some exaggeration and misrepresentation of essential events" in the latter's account. "I knew him very well personally and... knew about his attitude to the Jewish question... [and he] was well informed about my assessment of the persecution of the Jews..."

Schellhorn wrote that Popovici had "decisively rejected the measures against the Jews... and had done his best to control [the Jews'] misfortunes." He confirmed that Popovici's office was "the only oasis in Czernowitz" where "Jews found justice and help," with the caveat "at that time"; i.e., before the German consulate got involved, after which there were two oases. Schellhorn also believed that Popovici had acted on his own initiative in order to rescue Jews. He attributed Popovici's exaggerations and misrepresentations to the time of writing, when saying positive things about Germans was ill-advised. Schellhorn believed that the fact that Popovici called himself the savior reflected the "need for an alibi."

Schellhorn explained his views on reparations:

There can be no doubt that severe persecution of Jews, especially of those deported, would not have happened if the German Reich at that time had been a rule-of-law-state in the generally accepted sense of the word.... The former German Reich still enforced, with its allies, equal rights of Romanian Jews in the peace treaty of Bucharest of 7 May 1918.... the Romanian government would not have been able to carry out the persecution of Jews... if this [German ally] had not elevated the same injustice, i.e., crimes against the Jewish people, to a national principle. The German fault lies not so much in there being a "reason" in the legal sense of the word, but rather in the fact that a kind of antisemitism that ignored general legal norms was there, was exuded and was also aimed at. At that time, Germany was the only nation that would have been able to effectively take appropriate action.... To make amends for this neglect, to a fair extent, is a moral duty of the German people.¹³¹

Schellhorn here referred to Romanian deeds, not German deeds, such

130 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 1.

131 Ibid.; "Von Bratianu dem Älteren zu Codreanu und Antonescu," pp. 115–117.

as of the *Sonderkommando*. In Schellhorn's text this is followed by a critique of the legislation that based restitution claims on facts that were difficult to prove.

The witness Dr. A. Z., to whom Schellhorn gave the draft so he could hear his opinion, wrote on March 24, 1976, to the then eighty-five-year-old Schellhorn:

When reading your treatise everything came to life again and many of the events almost forgotten resurfaced in our [A.Z. and his wife's] minds. Despite all sufferings I underwent I never forget to think about you, my saving angel, who saved me from more bitter misery or even death.... As a former inhabitant of the Czernowitz ghetto I can assure you that not all there learned of your interventions.... But be sure that there are many Bukovinians, and I among them, who feel deeply touched when remembering you and who will remain grateful to you for the rest of their lives..."¹³²

Translations from German into English by Sara Kathrin Landa and Carolin Roder

132 Nachlass Schellhorn, PAAA, order signature 7, folder 6.